A Game-theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection

A Game-theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection
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Total Pages : 26
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ISBN-10 : OCLC:715939208
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Book Synopsis A Game-theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection by : Wanda Mimra

Download or read book A Game-theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection written by Wanda Mimra and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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