Download or read book Essays on Job Search and Hiring in the Labor Market written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 112 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three essays on job search and hiring in the labor market. My first essay studies intra-household risk-sharing and job search behaviors over the business cycle. In the Great Recession, the U.S. national unemployment rate rose above 10%. The Unemployment Insurance benefits were extended to as many as 99 weeks in some states. Such measures may be excessive for married people that can share risks with a spouse. I estimate a dynamic model of unitary households in which spouses make joint job search and savings decision. I find that intra-household risk sharing exacerbates the counter-cyclicality of the unemployment rate, but mitigates the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations. The results suggest the unemployment rate overstates the severity of a labor market recession for married workers. Given that spouses can share risks with one another, little is know about the efficiency of Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs in the household context. In my second essay, I compare the cost-effectiveness of various UI programs. The UI program is more cost-effective if the receipt of benefits is conditional on spousal non-employment or unemployment. In addition, the spousal unemployment requirement rewards intra-household risk sharing. As a result, the UI disproportionally benefit low-wealth households. Finally, I find little evidence that the UI program weakens intra-household coordination of search participation decisions. On the contrary, the spousal unemployment requirement strengthens the coordination between spouses. My third essay explores the mechanisms behind the phenomenon that both wage and the unemployment hazard rate decline with unemployment duration. I focus on two potential causes: skill depreciation and the stigma effects of unemployment duration. The identification of the two mechanisms can be achieved because the duration dependences of wage and hazard rate are affected by the mechanisms differently. I estimate a general equilibrium model with skill depreciation, unobserved worker heterogeneity, and an imperfect screening technology. Results show that less than 15% of the negative duration dependence of hazard rate is due to skill depreciation. In addition, I find that expansions that raise the meeting rate for workers substantially worsen negative duration dependence of unemployment hazard rate.